Essays on optimal extraction of groundwater in Western Kansas by Quintana Ashwell, Nicolas Efrain
Essays on optimal extraction of groundwater in Western Kansas
by
Nicolas Efrain Quintana Ashwell
B.A., Universidad del Pacifico, Asuncion, Paraguay, 2001
M.B.A., The University of Kansas, 2007
M.S., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011
AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Agricultural Economics
College of Agriculture
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
2017
Abstract
The two studies presented in this dissertation examine incentives for groundwater extrac-
tion and their resulting effect on aquifer depletion. Both studies apply dynamic optimization
methods in a context of irrigated agriculture in arid and semi-arid regions such as in western
Kansas. The first study examines the effects of capital subsidies aimed at increasing irri-
gation application efficiency. The second study examines the effects of changing incentives
posed by changes in climatic patterns and by technical progress in the form of increasing
crop water productivity. Both studies have significant policy and groundwater management
implications.
Subsidies for the adoption of (more) efficient irrigation technologies are commonly pro-
posed and enacted with the goal of achieving water conservation. These subsidies are more
politically feasible than water taxes or water use restrictions. The reasoning behind this type
of policy is that increased application efficiency makes it possible to sustain a given level of
crop production per acre with lower levels of groundwater pumping, all else equal.
Previous literature argues that adoption of more efficient irrigation systems may not
reduce groundwater extraction. Rewarding the acquisition of more efficient –and capital
intensive– irrigation equipment affects the incentives farmers have to pump groundwater.
For instance, the farmer may choose to produce more valuable and water intensive crops or
to expand the irrigated acreage after adopting the more efficient irrigation system. Hence, the
actual impact of the policy on overall groundwater extraction and related aquifer depletion
is unclear.
The first chapter examines the effects of such irrigation technology subsidies using a
model of inter-temporal common pool groundwater use with substitutable technology and
declining well-yields from groundwater stocks, where pumping cost and stock externalities
arise from the common property problem. An optimal control analytical model is devel-
oped and simulated with parameters from Sheridan County, Kansas– a representative region
overlying the Ogallala aquifer. The study contrasts competitive and optimal allocations and
accounts for endogenous and time-varying irrigation capital on water use and groundwater
stock. The analysis is the first to account for the labor savings from improved irrigation
technologies.
The results show that in the absence of policy intervention, the competitive solution yields
an early period with underinvestment in efficiency-improving irrigation technology relative
to the socially efficient solution, followed by a period of over-investment. This suggests a
potential role for irrigation capital subsidies to improve welfare over certain ranges of the
state variables. In contrast to previous work, the findings are evidence that significant returns
may be achieved from irrigation capital subsidies. Finally, a policy scenario is simulated
where an irrigation technology subsidy is implemented to explore whether such a program
can capture significant portions of the potential welfare gain. Results indicate that the
technology subsidy can improve welfare, but it captures a relatively small portion of the
potential gains in welfare.
The second chapter presents a dynamic model of groundwater extraction for irrigation
where climate change and technical progress are included as exogenous state variables– in
addition to the usual state variable of the stock of groundwater. The key contributions of this
study are (i) an intuitive description of the conditions under which groundwater extraction
can be non-monotonic, (ii) a numerical demonstration that extraction is non-monotonic
in an important region overlying the Ogallala Aquifer, and (iii) the predicted gains from
management are substantially larger after accounting for climate and technical change.
Intuitively, optimal extraction is increasing in early periods when the marginal benefits
of extraction are increasing sufficiently fast due to climate and technical change compared
to the increase in the marginal cost of extraction. In contrast, most previous studies in-
clude the stock of groundwater as the only state variable and, consequently, recommend a
monotonically decreasing extraction path.
In this study, the numerical simulations for a region in Kansas overlying the Ogallala
Aquifer indicate that optimal groundwater extraction peaks 23 years in the future and the
gains from management are large (29.5%). Consistent with previous literature, the predicted
gains from management are relatively small (6.1%) when ignoring climate and technical
change. The realized gains from management are not substantially impacted by incorrect
assumptions of climate and technical change when formulating the optimal plan.
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Abstract
The two studies presented in this dissertation examine incentives for groundwater extrac-
tion and their resulting effect on aquifer depletion. Both studies apply dynamic optimization
methods in a context of irrigated agriculture in arid and semi-arid regions such as in western
Kansas. The first study examines the effects of capital subsidies aimed at increasing irri-
gation application efficiency. The second study examines the effects of changing incentives
posed by changes in climatic patterns and by technical progress in the form of increasing
crop water productivity. Both studies have significant policy and groundwater management
implications.
Subsidies for the adoption of (more) efficient irrigation technologies are commonly pro-
posed and enacted with the goal of achieving water conservation. These subsidies are more
politically feasible than water taxes or water use restrictions. The reasoning behind this type
of policy is that increased application efficiency makes it possible to sustain a given level of
crop production per acre with lower levels of groundwater pumping, all else equal.
Previous literature argues that adoption of more efficient irrigation systems may not
reduce groundwater extraction. Rewarding the acquisition of more efficient –and capital
intensive– irrigation equipment affects the incentives farmers have to pump groundwater.
For instance, the farmer may choose to produce more valuable and water intensive crops or
to expand the irrigated acreage after adopting the more efficient irrigation system. Hence, the
actual impact of the policy on overall groundwater extraction and related aquifer depletion
is unclear.
The first chapter examines the effects of such irrigation technology subsidies using a
model of inter-temporal common pool groundwater use with substitutable technology and
declining well-yields from groundwater stocks, where pumping cost and stock externalities
arise from the common property problem. An optimal control analytical model is devel-
oped and simulated with parameters from Sheridan County, Kansas– a representative region
overlying the Ogallala aquifer. The study contrasts competitive and optimal allocations and
accounts for endogenous and time-varying irrigation capital on water use and groundwater
stock. The analysis is the first to account for the labor savings from improved irrigation
technologies.
The results show that in the absence of policy intervention, the competitive solution yields
an early period with underinvestment in efficiency-improving irrigation technology relative
to the socially efficient solution, followed by a period of over-investment. This suggests a
potential role for irrigation capital subsidies to improve welfare over certain ranges of the
state variables. In contrast to previous work, the findings are evidence that significant returns
may be achieved from irrigation capital subsidies. Finally, a policy scenario is simulated
where an irrigation technology subsidy is implemented to explore whether such a program
can capture significant portions of the potential welfare gain. Results indicate that the
technology subsidy can improve welfare, but it captures a relatively small portion of the
potential gains in welfare.
The second chapter presents a dynamic model of groundwater extraction for irrigation
where climate change and technical progress are included as exogenous state variables– in
addition to the usual state variable of the stock of groundwater. The key contributions of this
study are (i) an intuitive description of the conditions under which groundwater extraction
can be non-monotonic, (ii) a numerical demonstration that extraction is non-monotonic
in an important region overlying the Ogallala Aquifer, and (iii) the predicted gains from
management are substantially larger after accounting for climate and technical change.
Intuitively, optimal extraction is increasing in early periods when the marginal benefits
of extraction are increasing sufficiently fast due to climate and technical change compared
to the increase in the marginal cost of extraction. In contrast, most previous studies in-
clude the stock of groundwater as the only state variable and, consequently, recommend a
monotonically decreasing extraction path.
In this study, the numerical simulations for a region in Kansas overlying the Ogallala
Aquifer indicate that optimal groundwater extraction peaks 23 years in the future and the
gains from management are large (29.5%). Consistent with previous literature, the predicted
gains from management are relatively small (6.1%) when ignoring climate and technical
change. The realized gains from management are not substantially impacted by incorrect
assumptions of climate and technical change when formulating the optimal plan.
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Chapter 1
The Impact of Irrigation Capital
Subsidies on Common-pool
Groundwater Use and Depletion:
Results for Western Kansas
1.1 Introduction
Growing concerns about competing demands and heightened scarcity of water resources
have prompted a renewed interest in water allocation and policy. In North America and
many other agricultural regions worldwide, extreme weather events have created short-term
stresses on depleting water supplies. To address the perceived scarcity problem, policies
are often proposed to achieve water conservation, often with the goal of improving irrigation
efficiency. Subsidies for the adoption of efficient irrigation technology are commonly proposed
Originally published in Water Economics and Policy, Vol. 2 No. 3, DOI: 10.1142/S2382624X15500046.
Reprinted with permission.
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and enacted, in part because they are more politically feasible than water taxes or water use
restrictions. This paper examines the effects of irrigation technology subsidies using a model
of inter-temporal common pool groundwater use with substitutable technology and declining
well yields dependent on groundwater stocks, where pumping cost and stock externalities
arise from the common property problem. The stock externality arises because pumping is
constrained by the stock of groundwater and the pumping externality arises because changes
in groundwater stock affect the cost of pumping at the margin (Provencher and Burt, 1993).
The effects of the common-pool externalities are found by comparing the optimal control
solution to the trajectory of water use under competitive pumping. The model is most closely
related to that of Burness and Brill (2001). Like Burness and Brill, this study contrasts
competitive and optimal allocations and account for endogenous and time-varying irrigation
capital on water use and stock. However, the policy analysis accounts for the labor savings
from improved irrigation technologies, which is an often overlooked reduction in adoption
costs.
The potential efficacy of the policy instrument is illustrated via a numerical simulation
based on agronomic and hydrologic parameters from Sheridan County, KS, where irrigated
farming depends on groundwater pumping from the Ogallala aquifer. The study region is
representative of places with low urbanization and industrialization pressure, slow natural
recharge rates, and few remaining hydrologic connections between the aquifer and surface
water bodies that provide ecological services. This setting is descriptive of significant portions
of the 174,000 square miles overlying the Ogallala aquifer1 as well as a number of other
agricultural regions worldwide, where the principal trade-off is between current or future
water-use to produce food.
Efficient irrigation is often advocated as a valid way to achieve water savings because
1The aquifer and the areas it underlies are not uniform. The northern section of the aquifer (Nebraska
in particular) is thought of exhibiting larger saturated thickness and higher recharge rates as well as more
extensive interconnectivity with surface systems. However, variation exists even within states. For instance,
net recharge in Kansas vary from 0.05 acre-inches per year to 6 acre-inches per year resulting in extremes of
rapid aquifer depletion and places of positive changes in saturated thickness (Gutentag, 1984). Parameters
for Sheridan County, KS, are close to what can be considered average levels of aquifer parameters, a fact
that partially motivates its selection as area of study.
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more efficient irrigation systems make it possible for a farmer to deliver the same amount
of effective water with a lower volume of pumped water. However, the higher efficiency
modifies the underlying economic incentives that influence farmer behavior. Irrigation is a
land-augmenting input capable of transforming low quality land at the margin into higher
quality land, where all other factors of production become more productive resulting in more
land being brought into irrigated production (Caswell and Zilberman, 1983). Adoption of
a more efficient irrigation system may influence yields and affect revenues, impose different
pumping requirements and affect costs, or both. The adoption of a given irrigation technology
may be influenced by exogenous factors such as aquifer and land conditions (Caswell and
Zilberman, 1986) or endogenous factors such as crop choice when a crop rotation is already
in place and farmers evaluate an irrigation system upgrade. The direction of causality with
respect to crop choice is not clear, though. A number of studies model farmer decisions
as the combination of crop choice, acreage, and irrigation system – e.g., Ellis et al. (1985)
and Scheierling et al. (2006)– yet others argue that the irrigation system choice drive crop
choice so that more efficient irrigation systems make it more profitable to produce more
water intensive crops; e.g., Pfeiffer and Lin (2014). A recent study by Pfeiffer and Lin
(2014) shows that increased irrigation efficiency always results in higher groundwater use
when groundwater demand is relatively elastic.
Previous work on river systems shows that under certain circumstances adopting more
efficient irrigation technologies results in higher water use and faster resource depletion –
e.g., Ward and Pulido-Velazquez (2008), Scheierling et al. (2006), and Huffaker (2008). This
result is driven by the presumed reduction in return flows as irrigation technology becomes
more efficient and consumptive water use increases. In this case, subsidizing the adoption of
more efficient technology generates higher farm returns but reduces the availability of water
to downstream users. Even absent downstream use effects, higher water use may result from
associated increases in application intensity, irrigated acreage expansion, or both (Ellis et al.
(1985), Scheierling et al. (2006), and Pfeiffer and Lin (2014)).
A separate body of literature addresses the common-pool externalities in groundwater use
in a dynamic context– e.g., Gisser and Sanchez (1980); Shah et al. (1995); Burness and Brill
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(2001); Wang and Segarra (2011). The possibility of time-varying and endogenous irrigation
capital and application efficiency is rarely incorporated in these models; exceptions include
Burness and Brill (2001) and Shah et al. (1995). The role of irrigation capital subsidies
- in isolation or in combination with other policy instruments - to correct the common
pool externalities has not been fully explored. Ding and Peterson (2012) studied the cost-
effectiveness of two water-conservation programs in Kansas. One of the programs they
considered is very similar to an irrigation capital subsidy where the optimization occurs over
a discrete choice of irrigation technology. Their study focused on comparing the cost of
achieving a water conservation goal under each of the analyzed policies and under different
hydrologic conditions but it does not compare competitive and optimal cases, nor does it
quantify potential welfare gains from management.
1.2 Model
As the main trade-off analyzed in this research is between current versus future agricultural
irrigation for food production, net farm benefits are an appropriate metric for social welfare.
The optimal control model employed maximizes the present value of net farm benefits over a
time horizon by choosing optimal amounts of irrigation capital and water pumped, where the
state variable is aquifer water table height and the dynamic constraint is the change in water
table height. Because water is a “weakly essential” input for farming in the area, the revenue
function is the area beneath the inverse demand curve of effective water, where effective water
is defined as pumped water times an efficiency factor that depends on irrigation capital, and
where the evapotranspiration requirements are determined by the typical crop mix in the
region. The cost function is linear in applied water and inversely related to water table
height and well yield. The model incorporates maintenance and operation cost of irrigation
capital as well as a labor-saving feature accounting for labor savings from efficient irrigation
technologies.
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1.2.1 Hydrologic model
A very simple hydrologic model of an unconfined aquifer is employed. Sensitivity analy-
ses by Burness and Brill (1992) indicate that including further hydrologic details has little
quantitative effects on results. Furthermore, Brozovic´ et al. (2010) indicate that the use
of single-cell models may be adequate for small aquifers or a relatively small area within a
much larger aquifer, as is the case here. Since the aquifer model is employed to provide the
state variable only, the hydrological model is kept as simple as possible. The state variable
for the optimization problem is the elevation in feet above sea level of the water table. The
evolution of the water table elevation (or height) is determined by:
H˙ = 1
AS
[N − (1− α)w] ,
H(0) = H0 , (1.1)
H(t) ≥ Hc
where H(t) is water table height at time t, H0 is initial water table height, Hc is the elevation
of the aquifer bottom, AS is the acreage overlying the aquifer times the specific yield, N is
the (exogenous) volume of natural recharge per period, α ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of applied
irrigation water that becomes return flow, and w(t) is the total volume of irrigation water
pumped at time t. The return flow fraction is endogenous in this setting and is specified as
a function of the per-acre level investment in irrigation capital, k (in $/acre). The return
flow fraction is assumed to be decreasing in capital (∂α/∂k < 0), because more advanced
irrigation technology implies that a larger share of delivered water is consumed by crops.
At the most basic level, the relationship is rather simple: the more water is consumed for
irrigation, the faster the aquifer declines. However, a coupled system such as this involves
feedback loops: extraction of water for irrigation affects the aquifer but the state of the
aquifer also affects irrigation costs for farmers. In this formulation, farmers not only choose
water extraction, but also the level of investment in irrigation capital, which then affects the
proportion of applied water returning to the aquifer, α. Figure 1.1 is a simple representation
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of the physical relationships in the irrigation-aquifer coupled system.
The effects of aquifer depletion are felt inter-temporally via the decreasing water table
height due to pumping, which affects pumping cost due to both increased pumping lifts and
reduced well yields. The declining well-yield function, in acre-feet per hour, follows Sloggett
and Mapp (1984): Y = 2Q0d[H(t) − HC − d/2], where d is the drawdown of the water
table elevation at the pump relative to the pre-pumping elevation and Q0 is a constant that
depends on hydrologic properties. Clearly, well yields decline as the water table elevation
declines.
1.2.2 Pumping costs, agronomy and application efficiency
The marginal cost of pumping water in ($/acre− feet) at time t is
C(H) =
C0
Y
[
(SL −H(t))
(SL −H0)
]
(1.2)
where SL is the surface level elevation and C0 is the cost of pumping water for an hour at the
initial lift (SL−H0). The ratio C0/Y is the cost of pumping per acre foot (AF ) at the initial
lift, and the term in brackets scales this cost by the lift at time t in proportion to initial lift.
Water pumping decreases the water table height, which has a compounded impact on the
cost of pumping water. A decrease in H(t) increases marginal cost directly and via reduced
well yields, causing pumps to work harder and use more energy, which results in higher
irrigation costs per acre-foot. This formulation imposes pumping to become unprofitable
before the aquifer is depleted.
The crop water requirements CR, in acre-feet per acre, are assumed fixed for a given
crop mix at a level in which each crop in the mix achieves fully-watered-yield (FWY ). The
amount of water required to meet FWY in the area of study is CRA, where A is irrigated area
in acres. The water accounting identity that defines application efficiency is e(k) = CRA/w,
where e(k) ∈ (0, 1) is application efficiency. Application efficiency is an increasing function of
capital: e′(k) > 0. With increased investments in irrigation technology, application efficiency
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increases and water extracted decreases, all else equal.
Part of the pumped water is evapotranspired (consumptive use), part of it is evaporated
to the atmosphere, and part of it returns to the aquifer via return flows, α(k). All three
of these proportions depend on the amount of irrigation technology capital per acre, k.
Efficient technologies allow for lower amounts of pumped water, only small fractions of
which evaporate or become return flows, creating the incentive to invest in irrigation capital.
1.2.3 Capital costs
Realistic models of irrigation technology adoption consider the discrete choice among com-
mercially available irrigation technologies, as in Caswell and Zilberman (1985) or as in Ding
and Peterson (2012), where the choice is determined by the levels of expected profits un-
der different irrigation technologies given current aquifer conditions. Caswell and Zilberman
(1985) considers both water and non water costs associated with each irrigation system but
omit the upfront investment level, while Ding and Peterson (2012) explicitly include it and
compare it to the net present value of expected benefits in their irrigation technology choice
model.
This study, however, considers a setting in which irrigation capital is continuously mal-
leable as in Burness and Brill (2001), the cost of capital is annualized, and capital investments
reduce labor costs. This assumption captures the idea that there is a range of efficiency levels
and capital costs within each irrigation technology type, and with a large number of possible
choices this relationship is usefully approximated with a continuous function. Measuring
capital costs as an annualized expense merely amortizes investment costs into annual rental
payments on capital. To calibrate the application efficiency function e(k), a function is
calibrated to data points representing the three most common irrigations systems: furrow,
center pivot, and subsurface drip irrigation (see table 1.1 for benchmark values).
Figure 1.2 illustrates the procedure followed to calibrate irrigation efficiency as a func-
tion of capital per acre. The typical procedure consists of assigning a pre-specified irrigation
efficiency level to a given irrigation system. However, it is possible to achieve a range of
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irrigation efficiency levels with a given irrigation system depending on field conditions. Fur-
thermore, the amount of capital investment required for the installation of a given irrigation
system also varies. The efficiency function covers the overlaps over the levels of irrigation
efficiency and capital investment requirements for different irrigation systems.
The optimal level of capital is derived from both the cost of pumping water and the
financial and operational cost for a given level of capital per acre, k. The total cost of
capital depends on the total stock of capital, K = kA. Following Burness and Brill (2001),
operation and maintenance costs are assumed to be a proportion δ ∈ (0, 1) of the capital
stock, K, and that the rental rate of capital is fixed at r ∈ (0, 1), implying a total cost of
capital of (δ + r)K. Solving the water accounting identity for acreage, results in A = e(k)w
CR
,
implying that total capital can be written K = ke(k)w/CR and the cost of capital becomes
(δ + r)K = ηke(k)w, where η = r+δ
CR
.
1.2.4 Labor saving effects of capital
Bernardo et al. (1987) explore the role of labor-intensive irrigation practices as an application
efficiency augmenting factor given an irrigation system. In their setting, the presence of water
supply limits may force a farmer to increase the application efficiency of his existing irrigation
system by using more labor-intensive practices. However, it is also clear that highly efficient
irrigation systems have lower baseline labor requirements. The latter relationship is modeled
as a decreasing function of irrigation capital investment so the higher the investment, the
lower the cost of labor to manage the system. The starting point is a baseline labor cost
per acre θ and apply a labor-saving factor L(k), L′(k) < 0 such that labor cost per acre is
expressed as θL(k). In this formulation labor costs act as a component of the cost of capital,
falling as k rises.
1.2.5 Farm benefits
Net farm benefits at any given time are defined as the area under the value of marginal
product (VMP) curves minus pumping and capital costs. The inverse factor demands for
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water pw(w, k) and capital pk(w, k) may be obtained from static profit maximization. Farm
output is a function of effective water e(k)w and is defined as Q = F (e(k)w) such that F () is
monotonic, increasing and concave. Furthermore, water is assumed to be a weakly essential
input so that the VMP of capital is zero when water input is zero, i.e. there are no gains
from more efficient irrigation systems when there is no irrigation. Farm quasi-revenues are:
R(e(k)w) =
∫
Z
[pw(w, k)dw + pk(w, k)dk] =
∫ w∗
0
pw(w, k∗)dw
since the first integral is independent of path, Z is any path from (0, 0) to (w∗, k∗), and water
is a weakly essential input as described above. The net farm benefits at any given period is:
B = R(e(k)w)− C(H)w − ηe(k)wk − θL(k) (1.3)
1.2.6 Solving the optimization
Two types of solutions are considered which correspond to two types of farmer behavior:
myopic and planning solutions.
In the myopic scenario, the farmer maximizes (1.3) in each period given aquifer conditions.
This myopic behavior describes a competitive setting in which the farmer does not consider
the future consequences of his present decisions which is exactly the common pool resource
problem. The first order conditions for the myopic solution are
R′(e(k)w)e(k)− C(H)− ηe(k)k = 0, and
e′(k)R′(e(k)w)w − ηw[e(k) + e′(k)k]− θL′(k) = 0.
The planning solution (dynamic optimization) consists of maximizing the net present value
of farm benefits:
V =
∫ t∗
0
e−rt[R(e(k)w)− C(H)w − ηe(k)wk − θL(k)]dt (1.4)
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subject to (1.2), where future net benefits are assumed to be discounted at the cost of capital,
r. The current value Hamiltonian is
H˜ = R(e(k)w)− C(H)w − ηe(k)wk − θL(k) + µ 1
AS
[N + (α(k)− 1)w],
yielding the optimality conditions
R′(e(k)w)e(k)− C(H)− ηe(k)k + µ 1
AS
[N − (1− α(k))] = 0
e′(k)R′(e(k)w)w − ηw[e(k) + e′(k)k]− θL′(k)) + µ 1
AS
α′(k) = 0
µ˙− rµ = C ′(H)w,
where the primes indicate first derivatives and µ is the current value co-state variable
(marginal user cost) of water, which represents the value per unit of water conserved at
a point in time.
The planning solution is an appropriate proxy for the Social Planners allocation in situ-
ations where social welfare is defined by the benefits obtained by farmers, i.e. where higher-
value uses of groundwater such as urban or industrial use are negligible. Such circumstances
describe large spans of arid and semi-arid regions in the United States and the world.
1.3 Case Study: Sheridan County, Kansas.
The setting and assumptions of the model specified above closely describe the circumstances
faced by the region in western Kansas overlying the Ogallala aquifer. Figures 1.3 and 1.4
show the aquifer and aquifer conditions in the area. Hydrological and extraction conditions
are not uniform in the region. However, the choice of Sheridan County is appropriate on three
counts. Firstly, there is near uniformity within the county with respect to the agronomic and
hydrologic variables at levels that make the area representative of the average irrigated farm
in western Kansas. Second, the depletion of the aquifer has reached levels in which farmers
are concerned with the continuity of their operations and are demanding institutional solu-
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tions to the problem. Finally, the recent implementation of a Local Enhanced Management
Area (LEMA) in the county has brought much attention from groundwater management
authorities and could become a framework upon which future policies are based.
1.3.1 Model parameterization and initial values
Parameter and aquifer initial values for Sheridan County are presented in table 1.1. Aquifer
parameters were obtained from the Kansas Geological Survey (KGS), the Water Rights In-
formation System (WRIS), and the Water Information Management and Analysis System
(WIMAS). Labor saving is calibrated using a baseline labor requirement of 0.8 hours per
acre for surface irrigation versus 0.05 hours per acre associated with center pivot irrigation
(Bernardo et al., 1987) and wage rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational
Handbook (median agricultural wage rate). The interest rate on loans to farmers was ob-
tained from the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank (November 2011). Maintenance and
operation costs, δ, were set at 10 percent since the U.S. Master Depreciation Guide states
that irrigation systems are 7 to 15-years properties.
To establish the crop water requirement CR the main crops under irrigation in Kansas
are considered. Rather than specifying FWY as the maximum crop evapotranspiration
(ET), the Net Irrigation Requirement (NIR) or maximum ET less effective rainfall (Clark,
2009) is employed. The NIR for each crop was obtained from the National Engineering
Handbook. The weights (acreage shares) assigned to each crop were obtained from Clark
(2009). Table 1.1 summarizes the calculation of the crop water requirement. The functional
forms and fitted parameters for the application efficiency, return flows, and labor savings
functions are summarized in Table 1.3. The choice of functional forms ensures tractability
and the required (0,1) range for any possible value of k.
The pumping cost from 1.2 is calibrated by applying the well-yield formula and the
parameter values: C0 = 0.975, SL = 2, 755, H0 = 2, 644.2ft, Q0 = 3.48E − 07, and Hc =
2, 583.2. The calculation of pumping cost at initial lift follows Rogers and Alam (2006) for
an initial lift of 111.5ft, and an electric motor driven pump with electricity cost of 0.0834
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per kW/h.
The parameterization of the revenue function R(e(k)w) requires the estimation of the
water (inverse) demand function. Hendricks and Peterson (2012) present an estimation of
water demand elasticity using field-level data from Kansas over a period of 16 years and
controlling for field-farmer and year-fixed effects. Their estimated total elasticity of demand
is employed (-0.1) and a linear water demand function is recovered using the mean values
of water cost, quantity of water demanded, and application efficiency in their study. The
resulting inverse demand function is pw(w, k) = 286.19e(k)− 0.00377e(k)2w.
1.3.2 Simulation results
Numerical solutions are obtained for the baseline comparison in the absence of any policy for
the planning and the myopic solutions. Figures 1.5 –1.10 illustrate the difference between the
myopic and planning solutions over time. The planning solution yields consistently higher
water-table elevation in comparison to the myopic solution implying lower pumping costs
once the steady state is reached. The implication is, all else equal, lower production costs in
the future, which may allow for cheaper food, are consistent with the planning solution in
comparison to the myopic case.
In the earlier periods, there is excessive pumping, which drives the rapid depletion of
the aquifer. However, rapidly increasing pumping costs result in reduced levels of ground-
water extraction in later periods, which are below the levels under the planning solution.
The relatively low cost of pumping in earlier periods encourages underinvestment under the
myopic solution, but as the aquifer depletes and water becomes more expensive, the lev-
els of investment on irrigation capital increase in order to gain application efficiency. The
result is underinvestment in the earlier periods but eventual overinvestment relative to the
planning solution. As the model uses a malleable definition of irrigation capital, these re-
sults cannot be related directly to the rates of investment in particular irrigation systems
over time. However, the results can be put in some perspective by assuming a negligible
share of farmers invest in the most expensive subsurface drop system, and that that system
12
efficiencies reported in Table 1.1 remain constant over time. Under these assumptions, the
simulated gap at the end of the planning horizon implies that about 5 percent more farmers
would have upgraded from flood to center-pivot systems in the myopic solution than in the
planners solution. From Figure 1.9 it is evident that myopic pumping leads to more acreage
irrigated early on, but irrigated acreage also declines more rapidly over time, leaving less
acreage irrigated than optimal in the long-run.
An interesting result is that relatively early in the simulation, the planning solution
dominates the myopic outcomes with respect to overall Net Private Benefits. This is evidence
that significant returns may be achieved from policy intervention. The next section presents
the simulated effectiveness of alternative policy instruments in capturing this potential gain.
1.3.3 Policy alternative: irrigation capital subsidies.
An irrigation efficiency-improving subsidy in the form of a matching funds program is consid-
ered. For every dollar per acre invested in irrigation capital, the agent receives a matching
amount to be added to the investment. The problem is now modified so that the appli-
cation efficiency, return flow, and labor load functions become e(k) = 1 − eˆ1exp[−eˆ22k],
α(k) = αˆ1exp[−αˆ22k], and L(k) = Lˆ1exp[−Lˆ22k], where the values for the fitted parameters
remain the same as in the baseline.
Finally, since the farmers are receiving the matching funds to implement the applica-
tion efficiency-improving irrigation technology, they are responsible for the operation and
maintenance costs of the overall irrigation capital investment per acre, 2k, and only pay the
financial cost on their own portion, k. The adjusted capital costs entering the optimization
then become ηe(k)w2k− r
CR
e(k)wk, which to some extent prevents the abuse of the subsidy
on the part of the agents.
This type of subsidy policy is akin to that offered under the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP) which was reauthorized in the Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act of 2008 (2008 Farm Bill). A feature of EQIP contracts is a clause requiring that the
agent does not extend the area of cropland under irrigation. In this formulation, a simplified
13
version of the policy is modeled consisting of matching funds and no limitations with respect
to the acreage resulting from the optimized irrigation efficiency and groundwater extraction
in the simulation.
1.3.4 Policy Analysis
Figure 1.11 illustrates the impact of the policy being considered with respect to the water
table elevation, Figure 1.12 shows the time path of water extraction levels, figures 1.13 and
1.14 do so for application efficiency and investment in irrigation capital, respectively. With
respect to the saturation of the aquifer (water table height), the policy scenario results in
aquifer levels below the planning optimum in the long run.
With respect to water extraction, the irrigation capital subsidy is an improvement on the
myopic solution in about the first two decades but subsequently becomes indistinguishable
from the myopic solution. It can also be seen that irrigation capital and application efficiency
is consistently above the myopic solution such that it helps bridge the difference between
the myopic and the planning solutions in the first 40 or so years but it exacerbates the
overinvestment in the long-run. The clear implication is that any policy of this type would
have to be periodically revised and eventually eliminated, perhaps even replaced by an
irrigation capital tax for the later periods.
Figures 1.15 and 1.16 illustrate the impact of the policy with respect to irrigated acreage
and total Net Private Benefits received by irrigators respectively. As expected, the irrigation
capital subsidy results in consistently higher net private benefits than the myopic solution.
From a social efficiency point of view, though, such a subsidy imposes a burden on society
in general and the taxpayer in particular that needs to be accounted for. Consequently, the
total amount of (additional) subsidies paid to farmers is subtracted from the net private
benefits received by the farmers to approximate the Net Social Benefits under each scenario.
These results are illustrated in Figure 1.17 and summarized in Table 1.4.
From Table 1.4 it can be seen that with respect to Net Social Benefits the application
efficiency-improving subsidy policy is welfare improving. Additionally, from a local rather
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than societal point of view, a subsidy policy would be more attractive to the group that might
pose the biggest resistance to policy intervention, namely the farmers, since the burden of
the cost of the subsidy will be spread outside the region and will affect taxpayers everywhere
but the bulk of the benefits will accrue regionally. In fact, the EQIP programs are funded
by state and federal governments so all the benefits accrue to the region while the costs are
partially incurred by the whole country.
With respect to irrigated acreage, the irrigation capital subsidy results in consistently
higher irrigated acreage than the myopic case. This is an indication that irrigation capi-
tal subsidies result in the incorporation of otherwise unfit land into crop production, cor-
roborating previous findings by various authors – e.g., Ward and Pulido-Velazquez (2008);
Scheierling et al. (2006). However, in contrast to that literature, it seems that in the absence
of the surface water-groundwater interactions, the actual use of water is decreased with the
irrigation capital subsidy despite the increased irrigated acreage.
In the long run, though, the planning solution yields significantly higher net private
benefits than the rest of the cases.
1.4 Conclusions
Similar to the results derived from surface water models, the preliminary results suggest that
excessively efficient irrigation technologies may lead to increased or inefficient use, rather
than conservation, of water, at least in certain periods of the resource’s life cycle. Like
Burness and Brill (2001) and Shah et al. (1995), the results indicate that in the absence of
policy intervention, the open access solution yields an early period with underinvestment in
efficiency-improving irrigation technology relative to the socially efficient solution, which is
followed by a period of overinvestment. This suggests a potential role for irrigation capital
subsidies to improve welfare over certain ranges of the state variables. In contrast to previous
work, there is evidence that significant returns may be achieved from policy intervention.
Despite exacerbating the overinvestment problem in the long run, irrigation technology sub-
sidy programs may capture significant portions of the potential welfare gain in present value
15
terms.
The focus of this paper is to assess the impact of irrigation capital subsidies on common-
pool groundwater use and depletion in a dynamic setting and contrast outcomes between
the competitive and planning scenarios. To isolate the effect of endogenous irrigation capital
and to relate these findings to previous literature, other model parameters including prices,
crop water requirements, and crop yields, were assumed to remain constant over the plan-
ning horizon. To the extent that future long-term trends, such as climate change, enhance
the incentives for myopic farmers to invest in efficient technologies in later periods when
precipitation is more scarce, the role of irrigation capital and policies affecting it may be
even more important. Modeling these effects through time-varying policy instruments is a
potentially fruitful topic for further research.
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1.5 Figures
Figure 1.1: Typical Context of Irrigated Agriculture.
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Figure 1.2: Irrigation efficiency as a function of capital.
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Figure 1.3: Saturated Thickness of the Ogallala in western Kansas. Source: Kansas Geolog-
ical Survey.
Figure 1.4: Change in water levels from pre-development to 2009-2011 average. Source:
Kansas Geological Survey.
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Figure 1.5: Simulated Aquifer Water Table Elevation.
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Figure 1.6: Simulated Total Water Pumped.
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Figure 1.7: Simulated Application Efficiency.
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Figure 1.8: Simulated Irrigation Capital per Acre.
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Figure 1.9: Simulated Irrigated Acreage.
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Figure 1.10: Simulated Net Private Benefits.
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Figure 1.11: Water table height with irrigation capital subsidy.
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
W
a t
e r
  e
x t
r a
c t
i o
n
  ( t
h o
u s
a n
d s
  o
f   a
c r
e ‐
f e
e t
)
Simulation years
Simulation Results: Water Extraction(AF)
Myopic Planning Irrigation Subsidy
Figure 1.12: Water Pumping with Irrigation Capital Subsidies.
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Figure 1.13: Application Efficiency with Irrigation Capital Subsidy.
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Figure 1.14: Irrigation Capital per Acre with Capital Subsidy.
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Figure 1.15: Irrigated Acreage With An Irrigation Capital Subsidy.
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Figure 1.16: Net Private Benefits with Irrigation Capital Subsidy.
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Figure 1.17: Net Social Benefits with Irrigation Capital Subsidy.
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1.6 Tables
Table 1.1: Parameter and aquifer initial values for Sheridan, KS.
Parameter Value
Area overlying the aquifer 4155,620.5 acres
Irrigated area 77,745 acres
Specific yield 0.1725
Depth to water 111.5 ft.
Saturated thickness 61.03 ft.
Drawdown 20 ft.
Rate of natural recharge 28,747.08 AF/year
Efficiency
Flood irrigation 50%
Center pivot 90%
Subsurface drip 98%
Capital costs
Flood irrigation $33/acre
Center pivot $575/acre
Subsurface drip $1,188/acre
Discount rate 3.89%
Depreciation rate 10%
Baseline labor requirement 0.8 hs/acre
Wage rate $9.12/hr
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Table 1.2: Crop Water requirement per acre for Sheridan, KS.
Crop Area Covered NIR(AI) NIR(AF) Weighed NIR(AF)
Corn 86.9% 10.9 0.91 0.79
Soybeans 4.8% 10.1 0.84 0.04
Alfalfa 4.8% 11.8 0.98 0.05
Wheat 2.8% 6.5 0.54 0.01
Sorghum 0.7% 8.6 0.72 0.005
CR 0.897204
Table 1.3: Fitting of efficiency, return flow, and labor loading functions
Function Form Fitted function
Application efficiency e(k) = 1− eˆ1exp[−eˆ2k] e(k) = 1− 0.551e−0.00297k
Return flows α(k) = αˆ1exp[−αˆ2k] α(k) = 0.29257e−0.00192k
Labor requirement L(k) = Lˆ1exp
−Lˆ2k L(k) = 1.1839e−0.00512k
Table 1.4: Net present value of rents from irrigation.
Planning Myopic Subsidy
Net Farmer Benefits
NPV ($ millions) 142.5 133.1 138
Gain ($ millions) 9.4 6.1
7.04% 3.64%
Net Social Benefits
NPV ($ millions) 142.5 133.1 135.3
Gain ($ millions) 9.4 2.2
7.04% 1.67%
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Chapter 2
Optimal Groundwater Management
under Climate Change and Technical
Progress
2.1 Introduction
The economic dependency on irrigation of large agricultural regions such as the Great Plains
in the United States makes aquifer depletion a much-discussed policy and research issue.
Premature aquifer depletion can be costly. Temporal misallocation of the resource results in
suboptimal levels of social welfare derived from mining the resource over time. Furthermore,
premature depletion results in a diminished ability to cope with the added stress of higher
evapotransporative needs associated with climate change.
Despite the likely shift in groundwater demand over time, it is seldom accounted for
in the groundwater management literature. The shifts in temperature levels and seasonal
distribution of precipitation associated with climate change are expected to increase the de-
mand for irrigation groundwater over time. Technical progress in the form of improvements
in crop varieties that result in increased evapotranspiration productivity are similarly asso-
ciated with shifts in the demand for irrigation groundwater. In this paper, climate change
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and technical progress are exogenous state variables that modify the periodic value marginal
product (VMP) of groundwater in an optimal control problem. The gains from management
are found to be orders-of-magnitude larger than the case with static groundwater demand.
Also, optimal extraction reaches a peak in the future whereas extraction is monotonically
decreasing when groundwater demand is static.
There is a long history of literature studying groundwater as a common pool resource,
in which a socially optimal extraction path is compared to the competitive, or rather non-
intervention, extraction path. The implicit argument is that policy intervention is worthwhile
if there is a significant difference between optimal and competitive paths in terms of social
welfare. In a seminal work, Gisser and Sanchez (1980) found that the quantitative differ-
ence between competitive extraction and a socially optimal groundwater extraction rule was
negligible. These results, referred to as the “Gisser Sanchez Effect” (GSE), have provided
an economic rationale for opposing interventions that conserve groundwater for future use
and focus on allocation of groundwater among different uses rather than over time (Gisser
and Sanchez, 1980). The policy implications are important. For instance, the High Plains
Ogallala Regional Aquifer Study commissioned by the Department of Commerce and the US
Congress in 1982 predicted little to no difference in outcomes between a non-intervention
projection and a management scenario; no significant management initiatives were imple-
mented but the predictions in the study failed because the assumed dynamics of some factors
were incorrect (Peterson and Bernardo, 2003).
Although the GSE persisted in the dynamic solutions in numerous studies since the 1980s,
it has been increasingly clear that the GSE resulted from rather stringent and unrealistic
assumptions. See Koundouri (2004), for a critical survey. One of the key assumptions in
Gisser and Sanchez (1980), and most of the models that followed, was that of a static demand
for extracted groundwater. Brill and Burness (1994) found that the GSE is not robust to the
assumption of static demand and that growing demand will lead to an optimal extraction
path with periods of both increasing and decreasing rates of pumping. Models with static
demand involve only one dynamic state variable – namely the water table height – and
impose a monotonic extraction path that asymptotically reaches a steady state. However,
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historic data are generally consistent with non-monotonic extraction paths. Steward and
Allen (2016) show that groundwater extraction paths follow curves similar to the Hubert
curve in oil extraction studies. They estimate that peak “groundwater depletion caused
by overtapping”, i.e. extraction rates beyond the rate of available recharge, has already
occurred in many areas of the high Plains Aquifer while other areas are predicted to face
peak extraction levels in the future.
Most groundwater economics studies assume static demand for groundwater – an incom-
plete list includes Gisser and Sanchez (1980); Feinerman and Knapp (1983); Nieswiadomy
(1985); Negri (1989); Pulido-Velazquez et al. (2008); Esteban and Albiac (2011); de Fru-
tos Cachorro et al. (2014); and Esteban and Dinar (2016). Few exceptions have incorporated
non-static demand induced by additional control variables. Kim et al. (1989) presented an
n-stage optimal control problem that incorporates separate groundwater demand curves for
a set of crops over which the planner optimized intraseasonally resulting in a possibly shift-
ing aggregate groundwater demand curve. Another exception is the approach by Burness
and Brill (2001) and Quintana-Ashwell and Peterson (2016) which employs a model of sub-
stitutable irrigation capital in which investments in irrigation capital resulted in changing
value marginal product of pumped groundwater over time.
This paper relaxes the monotonicity imposed by single-state models1, allowing for the
possibility of non-monotonic paths. The formulation incorporates time-varying groundwa-
ter demand, explicitly linking the demand shifts to climate change and technical progress.
Increases in precipitation result in inward shifts of the demand curve while increasing po-
tential evapotransporation result in outward shifts of demand. Technical progress causes
the marginal value product of groundwater to increase over time in a manner consistent
with increasing water productivity of irrigated crops. Optimal extraction is increasing when
marginal benefits are increasing faster than marginal costs, as in early periods, then decreas-
ing once marginal costs increase faster than marginal benefits. It is shown that it may be
optimal for a manager to allow higher rates of extraction in the near future; for instance,
results from Sheridan County, KS, indicate that peak groundwater demand occurs 23 years
1See theorem 9.5.1 in Leonard and Van Long (1992), for an intuitive proof of this result.
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into the future.
While climate change and technical progress make groundwater for irrigation more valu-
able and productive, the decline in the stocks of groundwater results in increasing marginal
pumping costs due to increasing pumping lifts and decreasing groundwater well yields. The
net effect of these counteracting forces on the optimal extraction path is ambiguous. Fur-
thermore, when climate, technology, or both are assumed static, the plans that are optimal
under those assumptions are not optimal when both climate change and technical progress
are realized.
This paper also explores the nature of the “information effects” of prescribing extraction
plans that assume climate, technology, or both are static. The “law of unintended conse-
quences” is typically cited in political and economic policy circles to highlight the potential
of well-intended policies to result in undesired and undesirable outcomes. However, Merton
(1936) points-out that undesired is not equal to undesirable. Management plans that are
optimal under a specific scenario but sub-optimal in any other realization of the future may
still be desirable vis-a-vis non-intervention outcomes. To have a sense of how desirable the
unintended consequences of each plan are, the difference between forward looking plans and
myopic outcomes is contrasted under different realized scenarios.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, a stylized dynamic model of groundwater use is developed. The model in this
section is simplified as a linear-quadratic formulation in order to obtain analytical solutions
that develop intuition. In the next section, a more realistic formulation that requires a
numerical solution is introduced.
The analytical and numerical models are based on the single-cell framework, which has
been a workhorse of the groundwater management literature since its inception (Feinerman
and Knapp, 1983, Gisser and Sanchez, 1980). The single-cell model considers an aquifer
underlying a flat land surface with vertical sides and holding water that flows laterally at
an instantaneous rate so that withdrawals affect the water-table elevation equally in all
32
locations throughout the aquifer regardless of where it is pumped. A large number of users
of water are assumed to be distributed across the land surface, with identical technology
and exogenous prices so that a representative, competitive user can be aggregated to reflect
basin-level outcomes.
The single-cell model can be criticized for its strong assumptions about hydrology, which
do not accord with the spatial heterogeneity and the slow rates of lateral flow observed in
many aquifers (Saak and Peterson, 2012). Recent literature has relaxed the assumptions of
instantaneous lateral flow and spatial uniformity (Brozovic´ et al., 2010, Gaudet et al., 2001,
Guilfoos et al., 2013, Peterson et al., 2013, Pfeiffer and Lin, 2012, Saak and Peterson, 2007,
Suter et al., 2012, Xabadia et al., 2004) to study spatially varying common-pool impacts.
However, Brozovic´ et al. (2010) indicate that the more parsimonious single-cell model may
be adequate for small aquifers or a relatively small area within a much larger aquifer, as
is the case of interest here. Moreover, the focus is on region-level outcomes as opposed to
spatial patterns within the region.
A state variable of the model is the water table elevation, H , typically measured in feet
above sea level2. The aquifer saturated thickness and well-pumping lift can be formulated
from the water table elevation as
SaT = H −Hc,
Lift = SL −H,
where SaT is saturated thickness, Hc is the elevation of the bottom of the aquifer and SL is
the elevation at the surface (i.e., top of the well).
As the aquifer depletes, groundwater is pumped from deeper underground and the value
of H decreases. The more groundwater extraction exceeds the net recharge of the aquifer,
the larger the decrease in water table elevation. The equation of motion for the water table
elevation is
H˙ =
dH
dt
=
1
AS
[r − (1− α)w] , (2.1)
2For simpler notation, t−subscripts are generally omitted from dynamic variables, i.e. (H(t) = Ht = H),
but included when needed for clarity.
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where AS is the number of acres overlying the aquifer times the specific yield
3, r is the
instantaneous net rate of natural recharge of the aquifer, α is the portion of water applied
that returns to the aquifer, and w is the instantaneous rate of groundwater extracted. The
initial water table elevation is H(0) = H0 and SL > H > Hc.
The regional net benefits or rents from irrigation are represented by a reward function:
R (w; β,H) = B(w; β)− C(H)w; (2.2)
were w is extracted groundwater in acre-feet, β is a parameter that determines the marginal
value of groundwater, and H is the water-table elevation of the aquifer and represents the
amount of groundwater in the aquifer which declines with H. B(w; β) is the benefit from
extracting w units of water and C(H) is the (linear in H) cost of pumping each acre-foot
(AF) of groundwater, where B′(w; β) ≥ 0, B′′(w; β) ≤ 0, and C ′(H) ≤ 0. It is assumed that
there are no benefits when there is no irrigation (i.e., B(0; β) = 0).
The analysis in this section assumes the reward function is quadratic so that the benefits
from irrigation are the area under a linear VMP schedule,
B(w; β) =
∫ w
0
(β + γu) du = βw +
γ
2
w2, (2.3)
and that the marginal pumping cost function is a linear function of pumping lift, C(H) =
c(SL−H). The possibility that the marginal value of extracted groundwater may shift over
time is also considered such that
β˙ = b0 + b1β. (2.4)
The special case of static VMP, which is implicit in most previous studies, occurs when
b0 = b1 = 0.
First, consider the outcome of competitive pumping, in which farmers maximize the
periodic rents from irrigation in a myopic fashion. The solution to this optimization results
3The quantity of water which a unit volume of aquifer, after being saturated, will yield by gravity; it is
expressed either as a ratio or as a percentage of the volume of the aquifer; specific yield is a measure of the
water available to wells.
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in groundwater extraction in each period such that the value of the marginal product (VMP)
of groundwater equals its marginal cost of extraction: VMP = B′(w; β) = C(H). When the
VMP schedule of groundwater is assumed fixed over time (i.e., fixed β), only the marginal
cost of extraction, C(H), changes over time. As the aquifer declines, H decreases and C(H)
increases, resulting in a decreasing groundwater extraction path over time. However, when
the VMP schedule is allowed to change over time, for instance due to improved technologies
or changing climate, both the cost and value of groundwater extraction vary over time and
myopic extraction may not be monotonically decreasing over time.
Figure 2.1a illustrates cases where myopic extraction is increasing between two time
periods and Figure 2.1b shows the case in which it is decreasing between two time periods.
For simplicity, the case of a linear VMP schedule is illustrated. Increasing extraction over
time occurs when the increase in the value of groundwater is large relative to the increase in
extraction costs at the margin. Decreasing extraction over time occurs when the increase in
extraction cost is large relative to the increase in the value of groundwater.
Next, consider the dynamically optimal solution. A planner choosing an extraction path
to maximize the net present value of the stream of rents from irrigation would solve:
max
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [B(w; β)− C(H)w] dt (2.5)
subject to (1) and (4). In this specification, the problem is a linear-quadratic control problem
with one control variable, w, the aquifer state variable H, and an exogenous state variable β.
The full problem and its analytical solution are presented in the supplementary appendix.
The optimal solution is a linear feedback rule of the form:
w = V +W1β +W2H, (2.6)
where V , W1, and W2 are coefficients that depend on model parameters. The change in
extraction over time may be written as
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w˙ = W1β˙ +W2H˙. (2.7)
In the appendix, it is shown that the sign of W2 is positive. The sign of W1 is not
unequivocally positive, however. In the supplementary appendix it is shown that W1 is
positive for the range of plausible parameters for an aquifer. Only in the cases in which
there is both a high discount rate (10 percent or more) and very low expected productivity
gains (no more than 10 percent in productivity gains throughout the planning horizon) is the
sign of W1 negative. The two exceptional conditions of poor gains in productivity and the
heavy discounting of future benefits means that groundwater is not (more) valuable in the
future. At the extreme of no productivity gains and completely discounted future benefits,
the optimal solution would be myopic implying no gains from management are possible.
There is no authoritative reference with respect to potential gains in agricultural pro-
ductivity into the long-term, but working assumptions employed by USDA (Sands, 2014)
foresee increases in productivity between nearly 50 percent (oilseeds) to nearly doubling
(coarse grains) by year 2050. The discount rate condition is even more arbitrary; but the
discourse in academic and policy circles seems to be more for de-penalizing future benefits
by employing lower social discount rates (even zero or negative, in some cases; e.g., Hellweg
et al., 2003) than for heavier discounting. Consequently, the available evidence points to
scenarios in which groundwater will be more valuable in the future, in which case the sign
of W1 would be positive.
The positive sign of W2 indicates that decreased levels of groundwater stock create an
incentive for smaller amounts of groundwater extraction. Similarly, the positive sign of W1
indicates that increases in the value of water create an incentive for greater amounts of
groundwater extraction.
A key insight from equation (2.7) is that extraction may not be monotonically decreasing
over time. Intuitively, the term W1β˙ represents the impact of changes in marginal benefits
over time on extraction and the term W2H˙ represents the impact of changes in marginal
costs over time. If the benefits from irrigation are increasing sufficiently fast, extraction
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increases over time. Of course, the benefits from irrigation are not likely to continue a rapid
increase over an infinite horizon. If marginal benefits increased rapidly until infinity, then
extraction is monotonically increasing in the unrealistic case of a bottomless aquifer. In the
case of an aquifer with a bottom, then the solution is unstable because there is an incentive
to always conserve the water to some future period with greater benefits. Therefore, two
extraction paths are most likely .
The first likely path is when marginal benefits increase slowly enough in all periods such
that equation (2.7) is negative and extraction is monotonically decreasing. In the special case
of static marginal benefits (β˙ = 0), the extraction path is guaranteed to be monotonically
decreasing as in much of the previous literature (e.g. Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Feinerman
and Knapp, 1983; Allen and Gisser, 1984; Pardo et al., 1998; Burness and Brill, 2001;
Esteban and Albiac, 2011; Quintana Ashwell and Peterson, 2015; and Esteban and Dinar,
2016). The second likely path is when marginal benefits increase sufficiently fast in early
periods and then begins to slow down relative to the increase in costs. In this second case,
extraction is increasing in early periods then declines in later periods—effectively creating a
peak in groundwater demand.
This stylized model illustrates that dynamically optimal groundwater extraction is not
necessarily monotonically decreasing over time and provides an economic intuition on the
conditions that result in increasing extraction. However, a limitation of this stylized model is
that the linear pumping cost formulation approximates the marginal cost of pumping at the
initial lift but it progressively underestimates the marginal cost of pumping over time. As
illustrated in figure 2.1a, a marginal cost of pumping with shifts that are unrealistically slow
over time may erroneously prescribe increases in extraction when a more realistic formulation
results in lower extraction. Similarly, if an increasing path may be optimal over a time
lapse, the increasingly underestimated marginal cost of pumping would result in increasing
rates of extraction at larger magnitudes over a greater length of time than a more realistic
formulation. Furthermore, the linear (in lift) marginal cost of pumping implies an unrealistic
bottomless aquifer and a decreasing shadow value of groundwater– i.e., its value decreases
as it becomes scarcer (Tomini, 2014).
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A more realistic formulation would account for nonlinear (with respect to aquifer water
levels) increases in pumping costs over time. Unfortunately, no closed-form solutions are
possible for such a formulation of the pumping cost function: The model must be solved
numerically. The next section describes the numerical solution methods including a nonlinear
pumping cost function and details the decomposition of β as a function of climate (CC) and
technical change (TC) variables to model the shifts in the VMP schedule due to these effects.
2.3 Numerical Simulation Model
Optimal control problems are analytically untractable, except under specific functional forms
of the equations of motion and the reward function as in the previous section. In this section,
declining well yields are incorporated into the model which makes the pumping cost function
nonlinear (Brill and Burness, 1994). One important aspect of incorporating declining well
yields is that it effectively places a bottom on the aquifer. Unfortunately, the optimal
control problem with declining yields can not be formulated to give analytical solutions.
Consequently, a discrete numerical simulation model is created with reasonable parameter
values in order to examine the dynamically optimal path of extraction and compare myopic
and planned solutions.
The parameter values in the numerical simulation model are obtained or calibrated for
Sheridan County, KS, which is a particularly useful region to study. The hydrological and
agricultural uniformity of the region make the assumptions of a representative user and a
single-cell aquifer applicable. The region is also interesting from a policy perspective due
to the recent implementation of a farmer-led initiative “Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Man-
agement Area (LEMA6)”, which roughly establishes a 20 percent reduction from historical
pumping across the area.4 The planned allocations presented in this paper are informative
for such policies. Another advantage of selecting this region in Kansas is the wealth of
agricultural, agronomical, hydrological, and water use data.
4All farmers were given an allocation of 55 acre-inches per irrigated acre for the period between 2013 and
2017, inclusive.
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2.3.1 Hydrology and Pumping Costs
The hydrologic assumptions of the model are based on the single-cell aquifer framework as
summarized by equation (2.1) in the previous section. However, the cost of pumping is
modified here to capture the potentially nonlinear effects of declining groundwater stocks.
The cost of pumping depends on the amount of energy used by pumps to deliver groundwater
from the water table in the aquifer to the outlet in the irrigation system at a given pressure.
The decline in the stock of groundwater available in the aquifer affects the cost of (amount
of energy used in) pumping in at least two ways. First, more energy is required to pump
each unit of water because it is transported from deeper in the aquifer (i.e., pumping lift
(SL −H) increases). Second, more time is needed to extract a unit of groundwater as well
yields—volume of extraction per unit of time—decline. For example, a 50 percent reduction
in well yield requires 100 percent more time to pump a given amount of groundwater. The
well yield function proposed by Sloggett and Mapp (1984) is used: Y = 2Q0d(SaT − d2) =
2Q0d(H −Hc − d2), where d is drawdown and Q0 is a constant calculated based on well site
characteristics. This function has been previously applied in the economics literature (Brill
and Burness, 1994; Burness and Brill, 2001 and Quintana and Peterson, 2015 among others).
Combining these two effects, the marginal pumping costs in dollars per acre-foot is
C(H) =
c0
Y
[
SL −H
SL −H0
]
= C0
[
SL −H
H −Hc − d2
]
, (2.8)
where C0 = c0/ (2Q0d(SL −H0)). An important feature of equation (2.8) is that as the
water table reaches the bottom of the aquifer (H → Hc), the denominator approaches zero
and the marginal cost of pumping approaches infinity. Therefore, the water table never goes
lower than the bottom of the aquifer after accounting for the drawdown caused by pumping.
The parameter values for Sheridan County, KS, are summarized in table 2.1. The pa-
rameters in (2.8) are calculated following Rogers and Alam (2006) such that C0 = 0.975,
SL = 2, 755, H0 = 2, 644.2 ft., Q0 = 3.48E − 07, and Hc = 2, 583.2. Aquifer initial condi-
tions and parameters were obtained from the Kansas Geological Survey (KGS), the Water
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Rights Information System (WRIS), and the Water Information Management and Analysis
System (WIMAS). At initial conditions, the marginal cost of pumping is $22 per acre-foot
of groundwater.
2.3.2 Climate Change
Climate change affects both water availability and the demand for water (Doll, 2002). It
is multifaceted and spatially heterogeneous: different climate variables change in different
directions in different regions. Some regions of the world could face a decline in their water
availability while others could see a surplus water supply (Elliott et al., 2014). In the Midwest
US, irrigation requirements are expected to increase (Doll, 2002). Projections from USGS’s
National Climate Change Viewer show that little to no change in average annual precipitation
over time. However, the temporal pattern of precipitation is expected to decrease at critical
times in the growing season, making irrigation increasingly valuable.
To reflect the changes in the pattern as well as the levels of precipitation within the season,
the climate change variables associated with the model are: average precipitation between
January and April (J), average precipitation between May and August (M) precipitation,
and average evapotranspiration from May to August (E). Linear dynamics are devised for
these variables following the equations of motion:
J˙ = a0 − a1J (2.9)
M˙ = a2 − a3M (2.10)
E˙ = a4 − a5E. (2.11)
The parameters a0, a1, . . . , a5 are calibrated using values for each of the climate variables
at a starting point (t = 0), at an intermediate point (t = 1), and at the steady state
(asymptotic value as t → ∞). Initial values for average January to April (J0) and May
to August(M0) precipitation, and for May to August evapotranspiration (E0) are obtained
from Hendricks and Peterson (2012). Terminal (asymptotic steady state) values for these
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variables are the expected annual average levels projected for the entire period between the
years 2075 and 2100 according to the ensemble average projection of the 5th Climate Model
Intercomparison Program (CMIP5). Finally, the climate change variables are assumed to
change at decreasing rates reaching steady states asymptotically, so the largest changes occur
at the beginning. The largest changes in the United States Geological Survey’s National
Climate Change Viewer (USGS NCCV) are J˙ = 0.33, M˙ = −0.13,and E˙ = 0.01. The
parameters a0 thru a5 are found solving a system of 6 equations in 6 unknowns:
J∞ = a0a1 = J¯(2075−2100) , 0.33 = a0 − a1J0
M∞ = a2a3 = M¯(2075−2100) , −0.13 = a2 − a3M0 (2.12)
E∞ = a4a5 = E¯(2075−2100) , 0.01 = a4 − a5E0.
The initial value for the variables and the calculated value for the parameters in equations
(2.9) to (2.11) are reported in table 2.1. Notice that the value of these variables at time t
are easily calculated as
J(t) = a0
a1
+
(
J0 − a0a1
)
e−a1(t−1)
M(t) = a2
a3
+
(
M0 − a2a3
)
e−a3(t−1) (2.13)
E(t) = a4
a5
+
(
E0 − a4a5
)
e−a5(t−1);
where t can be in continuous or discrete time.
2.3.3 Technical Change and Groundwater Demand
Although advances in agricultural biotechnology, equipment, and machinery may occur in
response to market signals, these occur at aggregation levels that are distant from the relevant
decision unit: the irrigator. Consequently, such technical changes are exogenous to farmers.
Technical change may occur in diverse ways. Advances in biotechnology may result in
one or several of the following changes: (i) crop wilting points may be reduced; (ii) fully-
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watered yields may be increased; (iii) potential evapotranspiration may decrease or increase;
or (iv) the shape of the yield water response functions may change. Advances in equipment,
machinery, and farming practices may result in improved precipitation effectiveness or im-
proved application efficiency. All these changes modify the incentives of farmers to pump
groundwater.
In this paper, technical progress is modeled as shifts in a linear groundwater (inverse)
demand function that is conditional on climate conditions and where the intercept term
represents the state of technology:
pw(w; β0, J,M,E) = β0 − β1J − β2M + β3E − β4w, (2.14)
where w is groundwater pumping, β0 is the intercept representing the state of technology, J
is average daily precipitation between January and April, M is average daily precipitation
between May and August, and M is evapotranspiration between May and August. The
coefficients for J , M , and E are calculated and rescaled from Hendricks and Peterson (2012).
The demand function in equation (2.14) is consistent with a quadratic production function for
a composite irrigated crop that depends on the volume of irrigation water applied. Quadratic
crop yield response to irrigation is consistent with the agronomic literature that relates crop
yields to irrigation application (Martin et al. 1984).
Climate change affects water demand by allowing J , M , and E to enter as dynamic
parameters that shift the (inverse) demand curve for groundwater. Technical change affects
water demand through upward shifts in the VMP schedule by increasing β0 over time. The
equation of motion for the intercept is specified as a linear approximation of the rate of
technical progress:
β˙0 = b0 − b1β0. (2.15)
The initial value for β0 is calculated residually from the intercept term in the (inverse)
groundwater demand equation (β0(0) = 232.67). The terminal value is established to reflect
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an assumption of water productivity asymptotically reaching a level twice5 its initial value:
β∞ = b0b1 = 2β0.
Finally, to calculate the technical change parameter, b0 and b1, a 1.1 percent increase in
productivity is assumed on the initial period. This productivity increase is consistent with
what Quintana and Featherstone (2015) found for a sample of Kansas farms over the period
1993 to 2011. The time path for the technical change parameter is described by:
β0(t) =
b0
b1
+
(
β0 − b0
b1
)
e−b1(t−1). (2.16)
2.3.4 Groundwater Extraction under Myopic and Alternative Plan-
ning Scenarios
The difference in periodic groundwater allocations between myopic and planned scenarios
reflects the main societal trade-off between current versus future food production. In this
context, net farm benefits are a good approximation for social welfare (Quintana and Peter-
son, 2015).
The rents from irrigation function is the area under the inverse groundwater demand curve
minus the cost of extraction and represents the profits in addition to what can be achieved
from dryland rather than actual farm profits. The periodic rent function for irrigation is
expressed as
R(w; β0, J,M,E,H) =
[
β0 − β1J − β2M + β3E − 1
2
β4w − C0
[
SL −H
H −Hc − d2
]]
w. (2.17)
Given the state of the climate, technology, and the aquifer (β0, J,M,E,H), the myopic
5References on productivity ceilings are not easy to find in the literature. The productivity parameter
ceiling of twice its initial value is somewhat arbitrary but based on Monsanto’s stated goal of doubling yields
of corn and other crops by year 2030 (Edgerton, 2009). Most studies found on the topic of productivity
increase focus on yield trends suggesting average rates of productivity increases but few provide insight into
the decreasing rates of the increases ( Ewert et al., 2005, presents data showing the decreasing growth of
productivity gains over time).
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allocation is determined by first order conditions on the rent function:
∂R(w; ·)
∂w
= β0 − β1J − β2M + β3E − β4w − C0
[
SL −H
H −Hc − d2
]
= 0. (2.18)
In contrast, the optimal plan accounts for all state variables and maximizes the net
present value of the stream of rents from irrigation
NPV = max
T∑
t=0
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
R(w(t); β0(t), J(t),M(t), E(t), H(t), t) (2.19)
subject to the equations of motion (2.13),(2.16), and the discrete approximation of (2.1):
Ht+1 −Ht = 1
AS
[r − (1− α)wt] (2.20)
where wt is the total amount of groundwater extracted in period t, as opposed to the instan-
taneous rate implied in equation (2.1). Similarly, the rate of recharge in this equation is in
acre-feet per year (AF/yr, see table 2.1). The discount rate6 considered, ρ = 0.0389, is the
average interest rate on farm loans as reported from the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank
(November, 2011).
Four alternative plans of groundwater extraction are considered. Each of the plans
achieves the highest gains from management for the scenario it assumes . The first plan
accounts for changes in water table height, climate and technology and is labeled “Baseline.”
The second plan, labeled “No TC”, assumes there is no technical change: β0(t) = β0(0), ∀t.
The third plan assumes climate change does not realize (i.e., J(t) = J0, M(t) = M0, E(t) =
E0, ∀t ), and is labeled “No CC.” The last plan is labeled “No CC or TC” and considers
only the aquifer dynamics with the assumption that neither climate nor technical change
realize, i.e., the right-hand side of equations (2.9) through (2.11) and (2.15) equal zero.
By solving for different planned solutions, this paper is able to assess the “information
6There is a growing literature that deals with the question of how future outcomes should be discounted.
A discussion of the topic is beyond the scope of this paper but a good one is available in Gollier and Hammitt
(2014). In any case the 3.89 percent rate used here is within the range employed in the literature.
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effects” of prescribing a groundwater extraction plan without accounting for important dy-
namic factors that influence the incentives at play in irrigated agriculture. Each plan is the
best for the state of the world it assumes. However, by comparing across the solutions it is
possible to assess the information effects of plans that are formulated with assumptions that
turn out to be incorrect. For example, it is possible to assess the risks, in welfare terms,
of developing plans and implementing policies that assume no climate change or technical
change, when in fact those changes are realized. Similarly, the risk of implementing policies
can be assessed based on plans that do assume climate change or technical change, when in
fact those changes do not occur as expected.
The NPV of the stream of benefits under each planning scenario under alternative re-
alizations is calculated (i) when both technical change and climate change occur, (ii) when
only technical change occurs, (iii) when only climate change occurs, and (iv) when demand
is static. The outcomes indicate the loss in welfare from an incorrect plan that ignores a dy-
namic aspect of demand that should have been considered or accounts for a dynamic aspect
of demand that does not actually occur.
The effects of climate change and technical change on the aquifer become apparent when
comparing aquifer outcomes (water table elevation, pumping lift, saturated thickness) over
time. Because conservation is not a goal in the optimization problem it is not necessarily
expected that the optimal plan will result in an aquifer depleted to a lesser degree. Actually,
because what is being maximized is the net present value of the rents from irrigation (NPVs),
it is not even the case that periodic rents in the steady state would be higher under the
optimal plan.
2.4 Results
The optimization problem in (2.19) is solved with a quasi-newton algorithm in MatLab R©.
The states of climate and technology are calculated from equations (2.13) and (2.16) for
t = 0, 1, ..., T . The control variable w is a vector of size T+1 for which the entries correspond
to periodic groundwater extractions. The elements of a vector h represent the water table
45
elevation for each period and is calculated from each element in w. With each trial value
of w , the values of h and the NPV of stream of rents is updated. Outcomes under several
planing horizons were compared ( T = 200, 500, 700, 1000, 10000) yielding insignificant
differences in path and NPV amounts between horizons of more than 500 periods. Results
from T = 500 are reported unless otherwise indicated.
2.4.1 Groundwater extraction and depletion
Figure 2.2 shows the time path of groundwater extraction prescribed under each plan. The
“No CC or TC” plan has a strictly decreasing trajectory because it considers only one
state variable: the stock of groundwater, which drives pumping costs upward as the stock
diminishes. All other plans and the myopic outcome exhibit periods of increasing rates
of extraction induced by the increasing benefits of groundwater extraction from technical
change or climate change. In particular, groundwater extraction reaches the highest peak in
period 23 of the “Baseline” plan. The shape of the extraction path for all of these plans are
consistent with equation (2.7) in section 2.2 and the intuition from figure 2.1: a monotonic
path for plans considering a single state and a (possibly) non-monotonic path for plans
incorporating more than one state variable.
Although periodic groundwater allocations differ across plans, all forward-looking plans
prescribe lower rates of extraction than the myopic case for the first 37 periods of simulation.
This translates into more saturated thickness under the forward-looking plans– i.e., ground-
water conservation. Figure 2.3 shows the corresponding saturated thickness of the aquifer
over time.
Notice in figure 2.2 that the “Baseline” plan prescribes the lowest rates of initial rates
of extraction (i.e., groundwater conservation corresponding to a 20 percent reduction from
the starting point of the myopic trajectory7) but also allows to reach the highest peak
of extraction among the forward-looking plans. The differences in extraction between the
7Prior to the establishment of Sheridan County’s Local Enhancement Management Area (LEMA), average
groundwater use was 13.18 acre-inches (AI) per year. The LEMA established a limit of 55 AI over a five
year period, i.e. an average of 11 AI per year; which is a reduction of approximately 17 percent in initial
extraction rates.
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“Baseline” and the other forward-looking plans is relatively large while the difference between
the “No TC” and “No CC” plans is relatively small.
2.4.2 Gains under realized climate and technical change
Figure 2.4 depicts the path of realized rents from the different plans, assuming that climate
and technology change over time as expected in the baseline case. The rents from irrigation
are calculated from the periodic reward function and all the state variables are allowed to
update even in the outcomes where one or more of the state variables were ignored in the
planning process. That is, extraction occurs in the amount prescribed by each plan but
the profits from that prescription are derived from updated technology and climate. The
myopic outcomes are obtained from static periodic optimization considering the updated
state variables for each period.
As expected, there are significant differences in the periodic rents between each of the
plans and the myopic outcome (figure 2.4). The periodic rents from irrigation capture the
“information effects” of prescribing allocations from plans that consider different information
sets regarding state dynamics. Periodic rents under myopic pumping are slightly larger than
any of the plans for the first 25 periods but decline precipitously thereafter and myopic rents
are lower than any of the plans by period 30. The paths of groundwater extraction and rents
from irrigation have similar patterns but the difference in relative magnitudes among the
different plans is much larger with respect to groundwater extraction. Another interesting
feature is that planned peak groundwater extraction (around period 25) precedes planned
peak groundwater rents (near period 40).
Notice also in figure 2.4 that future rents from the alternative plans (not the “Baseline”)
yield rents consistently higher than the “Baseline” and myopic plans from period 50 onward.
However, if the goal is to maximize the stream of discounted benefits rather than to conserve
groundwater, then the problem is to identify the best path for decline. In this paper the
optimal path is determined by the maximization of the NPV of rents from irrigation over
the life of the resource which in this formulation reaches a steady state within the first one
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hundred periods.
A salient result from the simulations is that the myopic scenario reaches a steady state
much quicker than any of the forward-looking management plans because aquifer depletion
also occurs at a faster rate. The implication of this result is that the “option value” of having
a reserve stock of water is also eliminated in a relatively early stage. This means that the
ability to alleviate the effects of extreme weather or market conditions is essentially forfeited
early on under the myopic regime.
Table 2.2 compiles the net present value of the rents from irrigation (NPV), the potential
gains from management, the cumulative groundwater extraction, and the amounts of water
potentially saved under each alternative plan for the first two hundred periods of simulation.
The “Baseline” extraction plan yields the highest NPV of cumulative rents at $685 mil-
lion while the myopic outcome accumulates the lowest NPV of rents at $529 million. The
alternative plans, i.e. “No TC”, “No CC” and “No CC or TC”; yield accumulated NPVs
of $681 million, $679 million, and $659 million respectively. All the forward-looking ground-
water management plans yield significant potential gains from management for the first 200
periods of simulation. The optimal plan yields the highest gains at 29.5 percent larger NPV
than the myopic case. The “No TC” plan yields 28.8 percent gains from management. The
“No CC” plan yields 28.4 percent gains and the “No CC or TC” plan yields 24.6 percent in
potential NPV of rent gains from managing the aquifer.
Cumulative extraction over the first 200 periods was as high as 10.16 million acre-feet for
the myopic plan and as low as 9.37 million acre-feet (a 7.8 percent groundwater savings rel-
ative to the myopic outcome) for the “No CC or TC” plan. The “Baseline” plan prescribed
the largest amount of groundwater extraction among the planned outcomes at 9.86 million
acre-feet resulting in water savings of 2.9 percent compared to the myopic outcomes. The
“No TC” and “No CC” plans extracted 9.78 and 9.66 million acre-feet representing savings
of 3.8 and 4.9 percent from to the myopic case, respectively.
The contrast between cumulative NPVs and cumulative groundwater extraction high-
lights the implicit trade-off involved in the formulation of a groundwater management plan.
If the extraction from the “Baseline” plan is implemented and becomes the basis of com-
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parison, the results from table 2.2 can be conversely read as the costs in foregone rents to
obtain savings in groundwater– i.e., conservation. For instance, following the “No CC or
TC” plan would would save 494,600 AF(= 9, 863.5kAF − 9, 368.9kAF ) or 5.014% of the
“Baseline” extraction and cost $25.79(= 685.130− 659.338) millions or 3.7% of “Baseline”
profits. Based on similar calculations, the “No TC” plan saves 0.88 percent of extracted
groundwater with 0.5 percent foregone rents; and the “No CC” plan saves 2.03 percent of
groundwater at a cost of 0.82 percent of foregone rents.
2.4.3 Cost of no management vs. cost of incomplete information
An extraction plan drawn with specific paths for technical and climate changes that do
not realize would be costly. In that sense, the downside risk of prescribing an extraction
plan expecting climate and technical change is the potential relative cost of a plan that is
suboptimal in the alternative scenario that is realized.
Table 2.3 summarizes the gains from management for each plan evaluated under different
realized scenarios. The first column replicates the gains from management in table 2.2. The
remaining columns show results when technical change or climate change do not actually
occur. The gains from management for each plan in each of the realized scenarios (the
columns) is calculated in three steps. First, the periodic groundwater extraction under each
plan is valued to the present using the value function and the periodic realizations of the
different state variables. Second, myopic outcomes are calculated for each of the realized
scenarios, including groundwater extraction and the associated present value of the net
benefits. Finally, the value of each plan is compared to the value of the myopic outcome for
each of the realized scenarios. In each case, the plan that correctly accounts for the realized
scenario results in the highest gains from management.
The differences between best and worst plans under each realized scenario are a measure
of the cost of implementing an imperfect plan. The greatest such difference is found in
the last column of the table (when neither technical change nor climate change occurs),
between the “Baseline” and the “No CC or TC” plans. The gains from these plans differ
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by nearly $ 18 million, or 5.2% (= 6.1%− 0.9%) of myopic NPV. Thus, the worst outcome
for an imperfect plan - i.e., the largest “downside” risk - results when extraction follows the
“Baseline” plan but neither climate nor technical change actually occur.
In contrast, the smallest difference occurs when there is no climate change but technical
progress actually occurs (next-to-last column), and is the 1.5% (= 21.5%−20.0%) difference
between the “Baseline” and “No CC” plans. In the state of the world with technical change
and no climate change, all plans perform similarly. The performance gaps are intermediate
between these two extremes in the remaining columns.
Even in this worst case with the largest costs from an erroneous plan, the the “Base-
line” plan is still preferred to the unregulated myopic outcome. In fact, gains of 0.9% are
much larger than the typical GSE outcome. Nevertheless, if there are transaction costs to
policy intervention, the gains from management may vanish. If the prevalent belief is that
groundwater will not be more valuable in the future, it would be tempting to not advocate
for improved allocation over time because little to no real gains may be achieved in practice
and focus instead on developing institutions to optimize allocation among different -valuable-
uses (Gisser, 1983).
In contrast, the gains from management when climate or technical change occur are much
larger than when demand is static, achieving 20 to 30 percent gains depending on the plan
implemented and the scenario realized. The first three columns in table 2.3 show that not
having a management plan can cost about 30 percent in foregone profits when groundwater
becomes more valuable over time, for instance due to climate or technical change as is the
case in this example. Similarly, the cost of intervening but doing so incorrectly, i.e. having
the “wrong plan” for the realized scenario, is modest with at most 5 percent in potential
gains foregone vis-a-vis the optimal plan for that scenario. In sum, no-management is more
costly than management with incomplete information.
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2.4.4 Effects of alternative scenarios
As described in the previous sections, the model is parameterized to reflect initial condi-
tions descriptive of Sheridan County, Kansas. This section presents the results of alternative
initial aquifer conditions and alternative climate change scenarios. The exercise serves two
purposes: it serves as a robustness check and it allows an assessment of how different changes
in climate change scenarios and aquifer conditions – perhaps similar to conditions in other
regions – affect the optimal paths and potential gains from management. Each of the alter-
native initial aquifer conditions scenarios are evaluated under the same climate and technical
change as the “Baseline” case. By contrast, the alternative climate change scenarios “Slower
CC”, “Slower TC”, and “Slower CC & TC” scenarios assume the same aquifer conditions as
the “Baseline” but changes in climate and technology occur as described below. The shape
of the resulting groundwater extraction paths shown in figure 2.5 are consistent with the
intuition gained from section 2.2 under a variety of alternative parameter values and climate
and technical change scenarios.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show how the “Baseline” extraction plan compares to the optimal
extraction paths when alternative initial conditions are considered. Starting with figure 2.5,
the first alteration in initial conditions, “+20% Lift” reflects an increase of 20 percent in
the initial pumping energy cost (equivalent to a 20 percent increase in initial pumping lift),
all else equal. The second alternative initial condition, “+20% Sat.thick.” illustrates the
case in which 20 percent higher saturated thickness is initially observed. The “+20% Net
rech.” is the optimal plan when the initial rate of natural recharge is 20 percent higher than
observed.
The alternative climate and technical change scenarios consist in halving the rates8 con-
sidered in the “Baseline” simulation. “Slower CC”, represents the optimal plan when climate
change occurs at half the pace originally considered. “Slower TC”, represents the optimal
8The periodic climate and technical parameters are given by: β0(t) =
b0
b1
+
(
β0(0)− b0b1
)
e−0.5b1(t−1),
J(t) = a0a1 +
(
J(0)− a0a1
)
e−0.5a1(t−1), M(t) = a2a3 +
(
M(0)− a2a3
)
e−0.5a3(t−1), and E(t) = a4a5 +(
E(0)− a4a5
)
e−0.5a5(t−1).
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plan when technical change occurs at half the pace originally considered. “Slower CC&TC”,
represents the optimal plan when both climate and technical change occurs at half the pace
originally considered.
The outcomes with respect welfare gains, approximated by the net present value of the
stream of irrigator rents, are presented in table 2.4. Increased lift, slower change, and high
discount rates decrease the potential gains from management. The intuition behind the effect
of high discount rates is straight forward: it vanishes any future gains by discounting future
rents towards zero giving larger weight to rents earned earlier in the planning horizon. The
effect of increased initial lift is that pumping cost increases quicker than in other scenarios
thus drastically reducing the net present value of future rents. Finally, slower change implies
that the value marginal product of groundwater increases at a lower pace which reduces
value of future rents in a manner similar to higher discount rates but differing from it in
that it also makes the paths flatter (recall that non-static demand drives the hump shape).
By contrast, a greater saturated thickness, higher net recharge, higher demand elasticity,
and lower discount rate have the effect of increasing the potential gains from management.
Lower discount rates assign higher importance to rents achieved in the future so earlier
groundwater savings are not as costly in terms of NPV and can be translated into higher
returns in the future when groundwater is more valuable. Higher demand elasticity makes
the planner more sensitive to the nonlinear increases in pumping costs as the aquifer depletes,
thus inducing larger earlier savings and extraction peaks. Greater saturated thickness and
higher net recharge essentially allow for a larger amount of the resource to be managed and
clearly contrasts what is observed with the higher lift scenario.
All plans, except the case with higher net recharge rate, reach the same steady state
asymptoticallly. The case where a higher rate of recharge is considered allows for higher
levels of sustainable groundwater pumping. A feature in the narrative opposing (regulated)
groundwater management is that scarcity can be dealt with when it actually becomes a
problem at the field level. However, the results indicate that waiting might be costly in
terms of potential gains from management because the potential gains are reduced when lift
increases and saturated thickness decreases.
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The faster aquifer decline under the myopic outcomes reduces the stocks of groundwater
to be allocated over time. The substantially lower initial levels of extraction in the plan
that considers a higher lift scenario, in addition to a substantial reduction in the potential
gains from management, indicates that a higher lift scenario results in greater reductions in
benefits in the initial periods and less discounted net benefits over the long run.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper presents a framework to study the combined and individual effects of technical
change and climate change on groundwater extraction, the resulting aquifer decline, and
the expected rents from irrigation. The context of the study is a declining aquifer where
groundwater well yields decrease with the amount of groundwater stored and groundwater
demand is nonstatic due to climate and technical change. The problem is formulated as
a nonlinear optimal control problem where groundwater extraction is the control variable
and the elevation of the water table represents the state of the aquifer. The climate and
technical variables evolve exogenously while the aquifer variable is periodically affected by
groundwater extraction but not directly by the other state variables.
Four forward-looking extraction plans and one myopic extraction regime are simulated.
The forward looking plans are computed by maximizing the net present value of the sum of
the periodic rents from irrigation over the life of the aquifer while the myopic regime is com-
puted as periodic rent optimization based on first order conditions and periodic realizations
of the state variable. The Baseline plan has perfect foresight of the future realization of all
state variables accounted for in that optimization. The remaining plans ignore or omit future
realizations of climate change, technical progress, or both type of variables in prescribing the
respective extraction paths.
The parameters in the model reflect agronomical and hydrological conditions in Sheridan
County, KS and linear dynamics for technical and climate change are calibrated. Climate
change variables include periodic average precipitation between January and April (J), pe-
riodic average precipitation between May and August (M), and periodic average evapotran-
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spiration between May and August (E, alfalfa-based). A widely used formulation of the
aquifer dynamics is employed to update the elevation of the water table in the aquifer.
The numerical results indicate that the predicted gains from management are only 6.1
percent of the discounted stream of rents from myopic extraction if the plan assumes that
neither climate nor technical change occurs and these assumptions turn out to be correct.
This result accords with much of the previous literature and could be cited as a rationale
for opposing any intervention to manage groundwater extraction (Gisser, 1983). However,
once the plausible changes in marginal benefits over time (through technical change and
climate change) are accounted for, the predicted gains from management are between 20
and 30 percent of myopic rents when climate or technical change actually occur. This result
provides a strong rationale for groundwater management. Furthermore, the results indicate
that the gains from management are still large if technical change or climate change are
realized even if the plan ignores the dynamics of these factors. In fact, any forward-looking
plan fares better than the myopic regime in terms of cumulative net present value of rents
from irrigation.
All regimes considering technical or climate change allow for periods in which ground-
water pumping is increasing. However, all forward-looking plans suggest that an immediate
decrease from the myopic levels of extraction is necessary. The Baseline plan mandates the
greatest initial decrease in pumping rate or greatest initial groundwater savings. The pe-
riods of increasing pumping rates are driven by the increasing productivity of groundwater
(technical progress) and the increasing net irrigation requirements induced by climate change
(changing precipitation patterns and increasing evapotranspirative needs).
Increased rates of extraction correspond to higher levels of periodic rents from irrigation
so that faster decline and higher profitability could be expected in the next several periods of
plan implementation. However, disregarding the net present value logic of the optimization,
the periodic rents in the long run are greatest for the most conservative plans because these
have the smallest pumping lifts in the steady-state which result in the lowest pumping costs
in the long run.
When the optimal path of extraction is determined by the maximization of the net present
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value of the rents from irrigation, relatively large groundwater savings may be achieved
at relatively small foregone profits. However, when limited alternative (valuable) uses are
available for the resource, maximization of the NPV of cumulative rents seems to be an
adequate plan evaluation metric and the question that remains is how to discount the future
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The optimality of a future peak groundwater extraction results from the non-static
groundwater demand in the formulation. The shifts in groundwater demand are consis-
tent with the notion that groundwater will be more valuable in the future. Two plausible
avenues for how these shifts may occur are via changes in climate and technical progress.
By including exogenous state variables (climate and technology) in addition to the aquifer
state variable, this paper allows for a wider range of possible optimal paths for the aquifer
eliminating the limitation of single-state formulation which force monotonic state paths. Be-
cause such demand shifts are almost certain to occur and because they induce paths that
differ from the results of conventional one-state and static groundwater demand models, the
inclusion of multiple state variables and non-static groundwater demand should be the norm,
not the exception, in studies of optimal dynamic extraction of groundwater.
The rapid aquifer decline under the myopic outcomes and the results under alternative
planning scenarios suggest that delaying the implementation of groundwater management
plans may diminish the potential management gains achievable. Whether this should be an
argument for conservation or not is not discussed in this paper, but savings may be achieved
at the cost of relatively low foregone rents.
The contrast between the myopic and optimal extraction paths indicate that it is optimal
to prescribe significant groundwater pumping restrictions – on the order of 20 percent – at the
beginning of the planning horizon and to allow increased rates of groundwater extraction in
later periods when groundwater is more valuable. Consequently, it should not be surprising
if groundwater managers (of well managed resources) allow future increases in maximum
groundwater extraction in areas where restrictive groundwater management policies exist,
such as in Sheridan County, KS.
The formulation in this article employs private benefits as a proxy for social welfare.
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This is an adequate formulation for cases in which there is little regional competition for the
resource among other uses such as industrial or municipal. Furthermore, the formulation
implicitly assumes that little interactions exist between the stocks of groundwater in the
aquifer and surface waters and ecosystems. The formulation adequately describes the study
area in Western Kansas to which it is applied. However, when circumstances merit significant
impact on aquifer viability, ecosystems health, and availability to other competing uses, these
aspects must be incorporated in the modeling. Given the strong rationale for conservation
presented in this paper, it seems like the consideration of such environmental aspects would
further strengthen, rather than negate, the main results from this paper.
Another caveat in out model if the assumption of a fixed rate of net natural recharge.
Climate change can be expected to impact aquifer recharge. The growing literature on the
subject would greatly benefit from increased attention from economists. The assumption of
a fixed recharge rate in this paper is more palatable because it models the change in annual
precipitation patterns in an area were annual mean precipitation is projected to have little
to no change.
Finally, uncertainty or disbelief about climate change is an often raised objection to man-
aging natural resources. The numerical analysis shows that the downside risk of accounting
for changes in climate and technical progress that do not materialize is small. Although gains
from management would be reduced, returns are still better than the myopic outcomes.
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(b) Decreasing groundwater use.
Figure 2.1: Marginal cost and value of groundwater changing over time.
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Figure 2.2: Periodic groundwater allocation under different planning scenarios versus the
myopic scenario.
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Figure 2.3: Aquifer saturated thickness under different planning scenarios versus the myopic
scenario.
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Figure 2.4: Periodic rents from irrigation under different planning scenarios versus the myopic
scenario evaluated when both climate and technical change realize.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal extraction paths under alternative initial conditions and parameters.
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Figure 2.6: Optimal extraction paths under alternative initial conditions and parameters.
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2.7 Tables
Parameter Value
Aquifer
Area over aquifer× specific yield (AS) 716,844.54
Irrigated area 77,745 acres
Return flow (α) 0.086795
Initial lift (depth to water) 111.5 ft.
Initial saturated thickness 61.03 ft.
Drawdown 20 ft.
Rate of natural recharge (r) 28,747.08 AF/yr
Discount rate (ρ) 0.0389
Demand function
β˜0 232.67
Coefficient on J : β1. 44.548
Coefficient on M : β2. 18.383
Coefficient on E : β3. 15.055
Coefficient on w : β4. 0.0031
Cost function
C0 = 0.975 SL = 2, 755
Q0 = 3.48E − 07 H0 = 2, 644.2 ft.
Hc = 2, 583.2
Technical change
β˙0 = 10.134− 0.024β0 β0(0) = 232.67
Climate change
J˙ = 0.071833− 0.01333J J0 = 4.31′′
M˙ = 0.1484− 0.01333M M0 = 12.37′′
E˙ = 0.8199− 0.01333E E0 = 35.14′′
Table 2.1: Parameters and aquifer initial values for Sheridan Co.,KS
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Plan NPV Gains from Total GW GW
($× millions) Management (AF × 1, 000) Savings
Baseline 685.13 29.5% 9,863.5 2.9%
No TC 681.71 28.8% 9,776.6 3.8%
No CC 679.55 28.4% 9,663.0 4.9%
No CC or TC 659.34 24.6% 9,368.9 7.8%
Myopic 529.13 10,161.9
Table 2.2: Net present value of rents from irrigation and accumulated groundwater extrac-
tion.
Realized Scenario
Climate Change Occurs No Climate Change Occurs
Plan TC Occurs No TC Occurs TC Occurs No TC Occurs
Baseline 29.5% 30.1% 20.0% 0.9%
No TC 28.8% 30.9% 21.4% 4.0%
No CC 28.4% 30.8% 21.5% 4.6%
No CC or TC 24.6% 28.6% 20.0% 6.1%
Table 2.3: Evaluation of plans under different realized scenarios.
Plan NPV Gains from Total GW GW Effect on
($× millions) Management (AF × 1, 000) Savings Welfare
Baseline 685.13 29.5% 9,863 2.9%
+20% Lift 618.28 16.2% 9,243 10.0% (-)
+20% Sat. thick. 710.72 15.1% 10,219 8.7% (+)
+20% Net rech. 716.93 29.3% 11,088 3.0% (++)
Slower TC 626.76 18.5% 9,857 3.0% (- -)
Slower CC 603.55 14.1% 9,832 3.1% (- -)
Slower CC&TC 546.77 3.3% 9,823 3.1% (- - -)
-0.577 Elasticity 303.21 106.8% 19,536 ≈ 0 (+++)
1.5% Discount 1,423.20 77.9% 6,241 10.8% (+++)
5% Discount 532.80 18.8% 9,906 2.5% (- - -)
(+),(-): Difference with baseline is less than 10%.
(++),(- -): Difference with baseline is between 10% and 50%.
(+++),(- - -): Difference with baseline is more than 50%.
Table 2.4: Net present value of benefits and groundwater extraction for first 200 years under
alternative scenarios.
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Appendix A
Solution to the Linear-Quadratic
Control Problem in Section 2.2.
The LQ problem has the form:
R(w; β,H) = B(w; β)− C(H)w
=
(
β − 1
2
γw
)
w − 1
2
c2H
2 − (c0 + c1 (S −H))w (A.1)
= (β − c0 − c1S)w − 1
2
γw2 − 1
2
c2H
2 − c1Hw
where
β =
b0
b1
+
(
β˜ − b0
b1
)
exp [−b1t] (A.2)
H˙ = g(w,H) = n− aw (A.3)
where β˜ is the initial value of β, n = r
As
, a = 1−α
As
, r is rate of net recharge, α is return flows,
and As is area overlying the aquifer times specific yield. A well behaved reward function
requires c2 >
c21
γ
.
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Solving the control problem yields a 3× 3 linear dynamical system:
x˙ =

β˙
H˙
w˙
 =

−b1 0 0
0 0 −a
− (b1 + ρ) (ρc1 − ac2) ργ


β
H
w
+

b0
n
θ1
 = Ax+ b (A.4)
where θ1 = b0 − c1n+ ρc0 + ρc1S.
The steady state is given by x˙ = 0.
x∗∞ = −A−1b =

−b1 0 0
0 0 −a
− (b1 + ρ) (ρc1 − ac2) ργ

−1 
b0
n
θ1
 (A.5)
=

b0
b1
θ1
ac2−ρc1 − b0ab1c2−ρb1c1 (ρ+ b1) + nγ
ρ
a2c2−aρc1
n
a
 (A.6)
And the trajectories over time depend on the (negative) eigenvalues and eigenvectors of
matrix A. Eigenvalues: λ1 =
1
2
γρ− 1
2
√
4c2a2 − 4c1aρ+ γ2ρ2 < 0⇐⇒ ρc1 < ac2c2 < aρ ,
λ2 =
1
2
γρ+ 1
2
√
4c2a2 − 4c1aρ+ γ2ρ2 > 0,
λ3 = −b1 < 0
with associated eigenvectors:

v11 = 0
v12 =
γρ+
√
4c2a2−4c1aρ+γ2ρ2
2(ac2−ρc1)
v13 = 1

↔ λ1 =
1
2γρ− 12
√
4c2a2 − 4c1aρ+ γ2ρ2 < 0,


0
γρ−
√
4c2a2−4c1aρ+γ2ρ2
2ac2−2ρc1
1

↔ λ2 =
1
2γρ+
1
2
√
4c2a2 − 4c1aρ+ γ2ρ2 > 0,
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

v31 =
a(ρc1−ac2)+b1(b1+γρ)
b1(b1+ρ)
v32 =
a
b1
v33 = 1

 ↔ λ3 = −b1 < 0 so that the optimal paths are described by
the eigenvectors associated with the negative eigenvalues:
β∗(t) = β∗∞ + k3v31e
λ3t + k1v11e
λ1t (A.7)
H∗(t) = H∗∞ + k3v32e
λ3t + k1v12e
λ1t (A.8)
u∗(t) = u∗∞ + k3v33e
λ3t + k1v13e
λ1t (A.9)
where
k1 =
H0 −H∗∞
v12
(A.10)
k3 =
β0 − β∗∞
v31
(A.11)
The optimal paths are
β∗t = β
∗
∞ + (β0 − β∗∞) e−b1t (A.12)
H∗t = H
∗
∞ + (β0 − β∗∞)
(
a (b1 + ρ)
a (ρc1 − c2a) + b1 (b1 + γρ)
)
e−b1t
+ (H0 −H∗∞) eλ1t (A.13)
u∗t = u
∗
∞ + (β0 − β∗∞)
(
b1 (b1 + ρ)
a (ρc1 − c2a) + b1 (b1 + γρ)
)
e−b1t
+
2 (H0 −H∗∞) (ac2 − ρc1)
γρ+
√
4c2a2 − 4c1aρ+ γ2ρ2
eλ1t (A.14)
As the LQ problem results in optimal control that is linear in the state variables:
u∗ = V +W1β +W2H (A.15)
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ρ b1 c1 c2 γ a
Min 0.000 0.016 0.1824 32.162 0.00015 0.0000000144
Base 0.0389 0.024 0.6689 64.324 0.0031 0.0000002198
Max 0.1000 0.044 1.3378 128.65 0.0301 0.0008506944
Table A.1: Range of plausible parameter values for signing W1.
where
V = u∗∞ −
(
v33v12−v32v13
v31v12
)
β∗∞ −
v13
v12
H∗∞ (A.16)
W1 =
v33v12 − v13v32
v31v12
= b1(b1+ρ)a(ρc1−ac2)+b1(b1+γρ)
(
1− ab1
(
2a(ac2−ρc1)
γρ+
√
4a(ac2−ρc1)+γ2ρ2
))
> 0 (A.17)
W2 =
v13
v12
= 2(ac2−ρc1)
γρ+
√
4c2a2−4c1aρ+γ2ρ2
> 0 (A.18)
The sign of W2 follows from the condition on λ1 < 0. The sign of W1 can not unequivocally
be determined from necessary or sufficient conditions. Consequently a lower and upper limit for
admissible parameter values (see table A.1) are established and used along with the baseline values
to calculate the value of W1.
The values in table A.1 were produced as follows:
• ρ is the social discount rate conventionally set to account for the value of immediacy. In
investment decisions it is set as to reflect the cost of capital. In our paper we use the average
interest rate for farm loans as described (3.87 percent). The lower limit is set at 0 percent.
The upper limit is set at 10 percent (the highest average farm mortgage rate is as high as
5.7 percent in the Dallas Fed area).
• b1 < 1 is the coefficient that determines the rate of change of β and its steady state. This
is a calibrated parameter that depends on initial conditions, assumption of initial level of
productivity increase and steady state productivity level(β∞ = b0/b1), which this paper
assumes to be twice that of the initial productivity (b1 = 0.024). Supposing the steady
state could be as low as 10 percent higher than starting levels, we have that b1 = 0.0436. If
productivity is three times larger, b1 = 0.016.
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• c1 is the cost of pumping one AF of groundwater at the initial lift. This parameter is
calculated based on engineering formulas yielding an average of 0.6689 for a marginal cost
of $22/AF at the initial state. A lower-bound is set at $6/AF yielding a parameter value
of 0.1824. The upper bound is set at twice the base value at $44/AF yielding a coefficient
value of 1.3378.
• c2 is a coefficient that accounts for the nonlinear impact of a decreasing aquifer. The value
is calibrated based on nonlinear marginal pumping costs calculations based on a model of
declining well yields at 64.324. The lower and upper limits are set at half and double those
levels (32.162 and 128.648).
• γ is the absolute value of the slope of the groundwater inverse demand curve. The base
coefficient is 0.0031 (−0.11 elasticity). An arbitrary upper limit is set at 0.01 which is
equivalent to an elasticity of −0.03. Pfeiffer and Lin (2014) posit that elasticities may be
underestimated in groundwater demand studies. Scheierling et al. (2006) presents a meta-
analysis of irrigation water demand studies to that point with elasticity values as high as
1.86 for Howe et al. (1971). The lower limit is then set for an elasticity of −2 which equates
to a coefficient value of 0.00015.
• a = (1− α)/AS is an aquifer depletion coefficient that determines how much the water table
elevation changes for every AF of groundwater extracted. α is the portion of applied water
that returns to the aquifer.Specific yield ranges from 5 to 25 percent. Consumptive use could
be interpreted as the application efficiency which varies according to the irrigation system.
Howell (2003) shows the range of application efficiency observable, which can be as low as
40 percent for flood irrigation (up to 70 percent) and as high as 98 percent for LEPA center
pivot (92 percent average, 80 percent minimum) with low efficiency center pivots. The lower
limit is established considering the area of the whole High Plains aquifer (174,000sq.miles),
specific yield of 25 percent and application efficiency of 40 percent so that a = 0.0000000144.
The upper limit is established for 98 percent efficiency on a 36sq.mile area (size of a township)
with 5 percent specific yield so that a = 0.008506944. The used value is a = 0.0000002198 for
the average application efficiency and specific yield as well as the area for Sheridan county,
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KS.
There are six parameters with three levels each, i.e. (min, base, max), so that there are
36 = 729 calculations for the coefficient. Every calculation yields W1 > 0, even those violating
c2γ > c
2
1 and ac2 > ρc1. In only 23 admissible cases we see that a (ac2 − ρc1−) < b1 (b1 + γρ)
and ab1
(
2a(ac2−ρc1)
γρ+
√
4a(ac2−ρc1)+γ2ρ2
)
> 1; all of which require the highest discount rates and the lowest
terminal productivity (10 percent higher than in the present), failing any of these two conditions,
the inequalities reverse.
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